Date and Time
Friday, July 10th, 2026
17:00 p.m.-18:30 p.m.
Presenter
Dr. Bruno Strulovici (Northwestern University)
Title
Public Insurance Design under Electoral Competition
Abstract
We study public insurance when its design results from political equilibrium, focusing on health insurance as our central motivation. Electoral candidates compete over policies that allow for any coverage level of public insurance, moving beyond the often-debated binary dichotomy between universal coverage and pure private insurance. Voters differ in income and privately-observed health risk. The political feasibility of universal coverage is characterized by the median value of an index representing, for each voter, the ratio of the voter’s expected health losses to her income. Universal coverage emerges as a political equilibrium whenever the median of voter’s index exceeds a population average version of the index. This index remains a sufficient statistic even when voters also differ in their risk preferences. We find that the equilibrium level of public coverage is similar to that without private insurance, declining modestly to a median of 78%. We show that the equilibrium policy coincides with that of a utilitarian social planner weighing voters according to their sensitivity to policy. The analysis provides a political-economy rationale for public insurance programs like Medicaid.
About
We will have a research seminar with Professor Bruno Strulovici (https://faculty.wcas.northwestern.edu/bhs675/) from Northwestern University on Wednesday, July 9. Professpr Strulovici is an economic theorist whose research interests include dynamic and collective decision making, comparative statics, time inconsistency, law and economics, and contract theory. He was the recipient of a Sloan Foundation Research Fellowship and a National Science Foundation Early Career Development award, and is a Foreign Editor of the Review of Economic Studies and Associate Editor of the Journal of Economic Theory.
Venue
Mid Conference Room (Graduate School of Economics), Rokko-dai 1st Campus, Building Ⅲ 1F
Language
English
Co-organized by
Rokkodai Theory Seminar, Rokko ForumIntended Participants
Professors, Graduate students including KIMAP students and Alumni of Kobe University.
How to register for this seminar
Please register at the URL below.