Date and Time

Friday, June 23th, 2025
17:00 p.m.-18:30 p.m.

Presenter

Dr. Masaki Miyashita (University of Hong Kong)

Title

LQG Information Design

Abstract

This paper addresses information design in a workhorse model of network games, where agents have linear best responses, the information designer optimizes a quadratic objective, and the payoff state follows a multivariate Gaussian distribution. We formulate the problem as semidefinite programming (SDP) and utilize the duality principle to characterize an optimal information structure. A Gaussian information structure is shown to be optimal among all information structures. A necessary and sufficient condition for optimality is that the induced equilibrium strategy profile and the state jointly satisfy a linear constraint derived from complementary slackness conditions. Consequently, the true state is typically revealed to the entire population of agents, even though individual agents remain only partially informed. In symmetric network games, an optimal information structure inherits the same degree of symmetry, which facilitates its computation.

Venue

Mid Conference Room (GSBA), Rokko-dai 1st Campus, Building Ⅲ 1F

Language

English

Organized by

Intended Participants

Professors, Graduate students including KIMAP students and Alumni of Kobe University.

How to register for this seminar

Please register at the URL below.
https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1ngc9hr_yHIgoaphadEsVlayjiREWeb08WddfyjfE-WE/viewform?edit_requested=trueQ

Remarks

Please apply by Monday, June 9th if you would like to interact with Dr. Di Miyashita before or after the seminar.