Date and Time
Friday, September 19th, 2025
17:00 p.m.-18:30 p.m.
Presenter
Dr. Daniil Larionov (Universität Münster)
Title
Bilateral Trade with Costly Information Acquisition
Abstract
We study a bilateral trade problem with flexible but costly information acquisition. There is a buyer and a seller who can trade a single unit of a good through an intermediary. The intermediary proposes a trading mechanism to the buyer and the seller, who can then acquire information about the good’s quality by privately choosing a signal. We characterize the set of implementable mechanisms and focus on the classical question of the possibility of allocationally efficient trade. We show that any mechanism that implements allocational efficiency is revenue-equivalent to a mechanism that induces perfectly correlated signals. As an application, we consider the problem of an intermediary who seeks to implement allocationally efficient trade while minimizing the expected subsidy paid to the buyer and the seller. We obtain an Akerlof-Myerson-Satterthwaite-style impossibility result despite the presence of endogenously correlated information.
About
We will have a research seminar with Dr. Daniil Larionov from Universität Münster on Friday, September 19. Professpr Larionov is an economic theorist whose research interests include microeconomics, industrial organization, and market design, with significant contributions across a wide range of topics in the field. He has published his work in leading a peer-reviewed journal, Journal of Economics & Management Strategy.
Venue
Mid Conference Room (Graduate School of Economics), Rokko-dai 1st Campus, Building Ⅲ 1F
Language
English
Co-organized by
Rokkodai Theory Seminar, Rokko ForumIntended Participants
Professors, Graduate students including KIMAP students and Alumni of Kobe University.
How to register for this seminar
Please register at the URL below.